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Abstract 
 
CEO employment agreements and severance pay agreements are prevalent among S&P1500 
firms. While prior research has examined their impact on corporate decision from shareholders’ 
perspective, there is little research on their impact from debtholders’ perspective. We examine 
the effect of CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment agreements and severance 
pay agreements, on debt contracting. We find that compared with other loans, loans issued by 
firms with CEO contractual protection contain more financial covenants, particularly 
performance covenants, are more likely to have performance pricing provisions, and have higher 
loan spreads. The effect of CEO contractual protection is both statistically and economically 
significant. We further find that this effect increases with the monetary strength of CEO 
contractual protection and CEOs’ appetite and opportunities for risk-taking. Collectively these 
results shed light on the impact of CEO contractual protection on debt contracting.  
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1. Introduction 
CEO employment agreements and severance pay agreements are widely used by 
companies. As of 2008, over 80% of S&P 1500 firms have such agreements with their CEOs. An 
important purpose of using such agreements is to align CEOs’ interests with shareholders’ and 
encourage them to undertake risky projects since CEO contracts protect them from downside 
risk. Consistent with this purpose, recent studies have provided evidence that firms use CEO 
contractual agreements to motivate CEOs to undertake risky projects and that the existence of 
CEO contractual protection is positively associated with firms’ investments and risk (e.g., Huang 
2011; Xu 2011; Rau and Xu 2013; Cziraki and Groen-Xu 2015; Cadman et al. 2016).  
CEOs’ incentives to invest in risky projects have important implications for debt 
contracting. Risky projects can lead to a deterioration of credit quality and adversely affect 
debtholders’ payoffs. As a result, when lending to firms with CEO contractual protection, 
debtholders have incentives to monitor the firms more closely to ensure that the firms can pay 
interest and principal in due course, leading to an increase in the lending costs. In this study, we 
focus on these debt-contracting consequences of CEO contracts; evidence of higher monitoring 
and borrowing cost highlights a significant cost of CEO contracts that so far has been overlooked 
by prior research. 
CEO contracts protect CEOs from short-term performance swings and downside risk (e.g., 
Rau and Xu 2013). As a result, CEOs with contractual protection are more likely to invest in 
risky projects than those without contractual protection. Anticipating this, debtholders will resort 
to various mechanisms to monitor managerial actions and protect themselves. We focus on 
private debt in the main analyses since public debtholders often delegate monitoring to private 
lenders (e.g., Beatty, Liao and Weber 2012). Prior research argues that financial covenants can 
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help debtholders to monitor management by reducing managers’ discretion and by defining the 
circumstances under which debtholders can intervene (e.g., Smith and Warner 1979; Aghion and 
Bolton 1992). Performance-pricing provisions, by linking borrowing costs to firm performance, 
can play a similar role. Hence, we predict that compared to other firms, firms with CEO 
contractual protection will have more financial covenants and are more likely to have 
performance pricing provisions in their loan contracts. If the use of additional covenants and 
provisions cannot fully address the potential greater downside risk of investments, lenders will 
require a higher rate of return and hence firms with CEO contractual protection are expected to 
have higher loan spreads than the other firms. 
We focus on two types of CEO contractual protection: CEO employment agreements and 
standalone ex-ante severance pay agreements. CEO employment agreements are fixed-term 
comprehensive contracts between CEOs and firms. They generally specify termination payments 
and other terms such as non-competition and confidentiality. CEOs with employment agreements 
cannot be fired within the term without good cause. Standalone severance pay agreements 
stipulate the amount and terms of payments that executives can receive when their employment 
is terminated. CEO employment agreements and standalone severance pay agreements are the 
outcomes of the negotiation between the firm and the CEO.1 From the shareholders’ perspective, 
such agreements increase the cost of firing the CEO, therefore enhancing CEOs’ job security. 
However, they benefit the firm by incentivizing the CEO to undertake long-term risky projects 
and invest in firm-specific human capital. From the CEO’s perspective, such agreements offer 
protection by compensating the CEO for termination and downside risk (Rusticus 2006; Xu 
                                                 
1 Whether the CEO can obtain such agreements and the terms of the agreements depend on the uncertainty of the 
business environment, the likelihood of the CEO being replaced, and the CEO’s ability, among other things. See 
Section 2.1 and Appendix B for more detailed discussions.  
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2013).2  
We test our predictions using 6,470 loans issued by S&P 1500 firms with required data 
over the period 1995-2008. We hand collect information on CEO employment agreements and 
severance pay agreements from proxy statements. Given that the existence of CEO contractual 
protection varies with firm and CEO characteristics (e.g., Gillan et al. 2009; Rau and Xu 2013), 
we control for the endogeneity using both the instrumental variable approach and the Heckman 
approach (e.g., Doidge et al. 2004). We find that, consistent with our prediction, firms with CEO 
contractual protection include more financial covenants, are more likely to have performance 
pricing provisions in their loans, and have higher loan spreads than those without such 
protection. These results hold before and after controlling for the determinants of debt 
contracting as shown in prior research, CEO compensation structure and ownership, loan type 
and purpose fixed effects, and industry fixed effects. The effect of CEO contractual protection is 
economically significant. Compared to loans issued by other firms, those issued by firms with 
CEO contractual protection have 6.7 percent more performance covenants, are 11.4 percent more 
likely to include performance pricing provisions, and have 8.1 percent higher yield.  
There are two types of financial covenants, performance covenants and capital covenants. 
Performance covenants are based on current performance metrics, which are timely and forward-
looking indicators of negative trends in credit quality. In contrast, capital covenants rely on 
cumulated profitability and protect debtholders’ interest by limiting the amount of debt the firm 
can have. As such, unlike performance covenants, capital covenants are less useful in facilitating 
lenders’ monitoring of firms’ risky investments (Christensen and Nikolaev 2012). As a result, we 
                                                 
2 Although CEOs with an employment agreement or a severance pay agreement will not receive termination 
payments if they are fired with good cause, good cause usually does not include CEO incompetence or poor firm 
performance. That is, CEOs who are fired because of poor performance may receive termination or severance 
payments.  
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expect that loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection have more performance 
covenants, but we do not expect that firms with and without CEO contractual protection differ in 
the number of capital covenants. Our results are consistent with these two predictions. This test 
helps sharpen our inferences and sheds light on the mechanisms that debtholders use in the 
presence of CEO contractual protection.3 
CEO employment agreements and severance pay agreements vary in the monetary strength 
of CEO contractual protection. When the monetary strength of CEO contractual protection is 
stronger, its effect on CEOs’ risk-taking behavior is also more pronounced. Thus we predict that 
the effect of CEO contractual protection on debt contracting increases with the monetary strength 
of CEO protection. We find results consistent with this prediction.  
We then conduct a series of cross-sectional analyses. The main argument underlying our 
main predictions is that CEO contractual protection changes CEOs’ risk-taking behavior. Hence, 
the effect of CEO contractual protection on debt contracting should vary systematically with 
CEOs’ appetite for risk-taking and with their opportunities to undertake risky projects. Based on 
prior research, we argue that CEOs are less likely to undertake risky projects when they are older 
(Dechow and Sloan 1991; Cheng 2004) or when they have longer tenure (e.g., Berger, Ofek and 
Yermack 1997). As such, we expect that the effect of CEO contractual protection is weaker for 
older CEOs and CEOs with longer tenures. In addition, prior research finds that firms in the 
growth stage have more growth opportunities than other firms (e.g., Hribar and Yehuda 2015). It 
thus follows that the effect of CEO contractual protection is stronger for firms in the growth 
stage. The empirical analyses are consistent with these predictions. We find that as expected, the 
                                                 
3 This test also helps us further address the possibility that our results may be driven by high risk firms self-selecting 
into having CEO contractual protection, not by CEO contracts that create concerns for debtholders. Under this 
alternative explanation, loans issued by firms with CEO protection should also contain more capital covenants, but 
we do not observe this result.  
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effect of CEO protection on debt contracting is weaker when CEOs have a lower appetite for 
risk-taking (older CEOs and longer-tenured CEOs) and is stronger when CEOs have more 
opportunities for risk-taking (firms in the growth stage of life-cycle).  
Lastly, we conduct a series of additional tests to reinforce our inferences and to provide 
additional insights. First, we extend our analyses to public bond yield spread. We focus on bond 
yield spread because bondholders lack the monitoring incentives and renegotiation flexibility, 
and prefer to protect themselves via price terms (e.g., Bharath et al. 2008). Consistent with the 
finding for private debt, we find that firms with CEO contractual protection have higher bond 
yield spread than other firms. This result validates our inferences using private debt. Second, 
while some firms consistently use or do not use CEO protection throughout the sample period, 
other firms switch back and forth. To ensure that our results are not driven by the firms that 
consistently use or do not use CEO protection, we examine whether our results hold for the 
group of firms that switch. The results are qualitatively similar. In addition, when we use the 
difference-in-differences research design for the switch firms and non-switch firms, our 
inferences continue to hold. Third, our results also hold after we control for additional 
governance variables such as board independence, E-index, and a founder CEO indicator, and 
CEO inside debt based on the subsample for which the data are available. Lastly, in the main 
analyses, we combine employment agreements and severance pay agreements together because 
both types of agreements protect CEOs from short-term performance swings and downside risk. 
When we separately examine these two types of agreements, we find that the results hold for 
both types.  
Our paper makes several important contributions. First, we contribute to the emerging 
literature on CEO employment contracts. This literature mainly focuses on the determinants of 
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CEO contracts and how they affect managers’ investment and reporting behavior from 
shareholders’ perspective. In contrast, we focus on the implications of CEO employment 
contracts for debt contracting. Our findings suggest that while CEO contractual protection aligns 
CEOs’ and shareholders’ interests, it can adversely affect debtholders’ interest and thus affect 
debt contracting, which presents an unintended cost of such contracts. Thus our paper 
complements prior research that has focused on the benefits of CEO contracts to shareholders 
and, together with prior research, provides a more complete understanding of the economic 
consequences of CEO employment contracts. 
 Second, our paper also contributes to the literature on the relationship between CEO equity 
incentives and debt contracting. Prior studies have focused on how managerial ownership and 
equity-based compensation affect the pricing of public debt (Bagnani et al. 1994; Begley and 
Feltham 1999; Ortiz-Molina 2006) and debt maturity (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Kartik 2005; 
Brockman, Martin, and Unlu 2010). 4 Both CEO equity incentives and contractual protection can 
align the interests of CEOs and shareholders and adversely affect debtholders, but the underlying 
reasons are different. While equity incentives enhance the upside potential of risky investments 
for CEOs, contractual protection increases their job security and limits the downside risk. We 
provide evidence on the incremental effect of CEO contractual protection, including employment 
agreements and standalone severance pay agreements, both of which are widely used in practice. 
In addition, we examine both private debt and public debt, providing a more comprehensive 
picture of the impact of CEO contracts on debt contracting than prior research. Finally, because 
private lenders have stronger incentives and greater resources to monitor firms (Beatty et al. 
                                                 
4 Another stream of literature examines how CEO debt-like compensation can be used to align the interests of CEOs 
and debtholders and reduce debt contracting costs (e.g., Sundaram and Yermack 2007; Chava, Kumar, and Warga 
2010; Wei and Yermack 2011; Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong 2014). Our paper, in contrast, focuses on the 
unintended debt contracting consequences of using CEO employment contracts to align the interests of CEOs and 
shareholders. In addition, our results hold after controlling for CEO inside debt.  
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2012), we examine not only the pricing of debt as in prior studies, but also the monitoring 
mechanisms (financial covenants and performance-pricing provisions) that private lenders use in 
response to CEO contracts.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature and 
develops the predictions. Section 3 discusses the sample and data. Section 4 reports the main 
analyses and the cross-sectional tests. Section 5 reports the additional analyses. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Literature review 
Prior research on CEO employment agreements and severance pay agreements  
Following Chen et al. (2015), we focus on CEO contractual protection in the form of CEO 
employment agreements and severance pay agreements. A CEO employment agreement (EA) is 
a comprehensive written agreement that specifies the employment terms between a firm and its 
CEO, including the CEO’s responsibilities, compensation, perquisites, termination conditions 
and payments (e.g., severance pay), and restrictions on outside activities. A typical EA has a 
fixed term of two to five years and can be renewed, amended, or extended. Within the contract 
terms, CEOs cannot be dismissed without good cause, which usually includes breach of fiduciary 
duties and willful misconduct but does not include incompetence or poor performance. In 
contrast, CEOs without EAs are employed at will. These CEOs can be removed whenever the 
boards find it to be in the best interest of the companies. A standalone severance pay agreement 
(SA) specifies the amount and conditions of the payments to a CEO upon the CEO’s dismissal 
without good cause. The definition of good cause is similar to that in EAs. Unlike an EA, an SA 
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does not have a definite term and hence covers the CEO for the foreseeable future.  
Both EAs and SAs are the outcome of negotiations between firms and their CEOs. From 
the CEOs’ perspective, such agreements are beneficial because they offer protection. The benefit 
likely increases with the uncertainty over whether the CEO is a good fit for the firm and the 
likelihood of CEO dismissal (Schwab and Thomas 2006). From the firm’s perspective, such 
agreements are costly because they make it more difficult to renegotiate with a CEO or to 
terminate the employment. At the same time, these agreements allow the firm to attract CEO 
candidates who otherwise would not consider the position. They can also be used ex ante to 
address the agency problems between CEOs and shareholders, such as CEOs avoiding risky but 
positive net present value projects or engaging in suboptimal behavior to deliver short-term 
performance (Almazan and Suarez 2003; Inderst and Mueller 2005; Rau and Xu 2013).  
Several recent studies examine the determinants of EAs or SAs. For example, Gillan et al. 
(2009) examine the determinants of EAs among S&P 500 firms and find that CEOs are more 
likely to have EAs when the uncertainty of the business environment is higher, when the 
likelihood of CEO being replaced is greater, and when CEOs have more to lose if replaced. Rau 
and Xu (2013) and Cadman et al. (2016) find that SAs are more likely to be used when 
executives’ human capital is at greater risk and conclude that SAs are largely a means of 
compensating for risk.5 
Prior research on CEO equity incentives and debt contracting  
CEO equity incentives, while aligning the interests of CEOs and shareholders, can 
                                                 
5 It can also be argued that EAs and SAs reflect CEO entrenchment and poor corporate governance (e.g., Bebchuk 
and Fried 2004). For example, Yermack (2006) and Rusticus (2006) find that the use of SAs is higher for firms with 
weaker corporate governance. As discussed later, CEO entrenchment cannot necessarily explain the adverse 
implications of CEO protection for debt contracting because some prior studies argue that CEO entrenchment 
reduces debtholder-shareholder agency conflict, leading to the opposite prediction. In addition, it cannot explain our 
cross-sectional results that the effect of CEO protection on debt contracting varies predictably with CEO’s risk-
taking appetite and risk-taking opportunities. Note also that while the popular press sometimes laments the excessive 
ex post severance payments, our paper focus on ex ante CEO contracts, not ex post payments. 
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adversely affect debt contracting. Prior research examines how CEO equity incentives affect the 
pricing of public debt and debt maturity. For example, Bagnani et al. (1994) document a positive 
correlation between managerial ownership and bond return premia. Ortiz-Molina (2006) 
documents a positive correlation between managerial ownership, particularly the ownership of 
stock options, and bond yield. Begley and Feltham (1999) find that managerial ownership is 
positively correlated with the use of dividend and borrowing covenants for public debt. Datta et 
al. (2005) find that managerial ownership is negatively associated with debt maturity. Brockman 
et al. (2010) find a negative (positive) association between CEO portfolio delta (vega) and the 
proportion of short-term debt in total debt. Our study differs from and complements the above-
mentioned studies by investigating the impact on debt contracting of CEO contractual protection, 
which reduces CEO’s downside risk. In addition, we examine both the pricing and non-pricing 
elements (i.e., financial covenants and performance-pricing provisions) of debt contracting, 
providing a more comprehensive picture of the impact of CEO contractual protection on debt 
contracting.  
2.2 The main predictions 
When deciding the loan terms, creditors are concerned with managers’ actions that affect 
their investment return, i.e., the firms’ ability to pay interest and principal. CEO contractual 
protection can affect the loan terms because it can change CEOs’ risk-taking behavior. First, 
CEO contractual protection enhances job security. It is more costly for a firm to dismiss a CEO 
with contractual protection, and hence the CEO will be better protected from poor performance. 
Prior studies provide evidence consistent with this argument. For example, Rusticus (2006) and 
Xu (2011) find that CEO employment agreements and severance pay agreements reduce the 
likelihood of CEO turnover after poor performance. Second, CEO contractual protection, at least 
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partly, compensates CEOs for downside risk. The termination payments act as a form of deferred 
compensation and safeguard against downside risk (Rau and Xu 2013).  
Both the enhanced job security and the deferred risk premium encourage the CEO to 
undertake risky, long-term projects. For example, Gillan et al. (2009) argue that “CEOs facing 
less uncertainty are less likely to avoid risky positive net present value projects.” Recent studies 
provide evidence consistent with the argument that CEO contractual protection influences the 
level of firms’ long-term investments (Huang 2011; Xu 2011; Chen et al. 2015).  
It thus follows that when CEOs have contractual protection, lenders will monitor the firms 
more closely. Prior research argues that financial covenants can help debtholders to monitor 
management by reducing managers’ discretion and by defining the circumstances under which 
debtholders can intervene (e.g., Smith and Warner 1979; Aghion and Bolton 1992). More 
recently, Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) argue that performance covenants, an important group 
of financial covenants, act as tripwires to detect early signals of financial distress; when a 
performance covenant is violated, lenders can have the control rights and take actions to limit 
their losses (e.g., through renegotiation and the acceleration of loans, among other things). 
Performance pricing provisions, which tie interest rates to pre-specified performance measures, 
also facilitate lenders’ monitoring (Asquith, Beatty, and Webber 2005). The above discussion 
leads to our first two hypotheses:  
H1: Ceteris paribus, loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection have more 
financial covenants than those issued by other firms. 
H2: Ceteris paribus, loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection are more likely 
to have performance pricing provisions than those issued by other firms. 
 
However, we might not find results consistent with H1 and H2 for a couple of reasons. 
First, the use of CEO contractual protection might not incentivize managers to undertake risky 
projects. Some prior studies (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Yermack 2006; Rustics 2006) argue 
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and document results implying that the use of CEO contractual agreements reflects managerial 
entrenchment. Chava et al. (2010) show that managerial entrenchment actually reduces 
shareholder-debtholder agency conflict and can reduce the use of debt covenants. Second, 
Armstrong et al. (2010) argue that it is difficult to use debt covenants to fully address firms’ 
excessive risk-taking behavior. Thus, whether CEO contractual protection is related to the use of 
financial covenants and performance pricing provisions, as hypothesized in H1 and H2, is an 
empirical question.  
Lenders use covenants and interest rates jointly to address the problem of managers 
undertaking excessive risky investments. To the extent that debt covenants cannot fully address 
the problem or the use of debt covenants becomes too restrictive, interest rate is expected to be 
higher in firms with CEO contractual protection than in other firms. As such, we expect the 
following: 
H3: Ceteris paribus, loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection have higher 
spread than those issued by other firms. 
 
Monetary strength of CEO contractual protection 
CEO employment agreements and severance pay agreements vary in the extent of CEO 
contractual protection. Specifically, the monetary strength of CEO contractual protection varies 
across firms. While some firms offer the annual base salary as the severance pay, others pay 
three times more. When the monetary strength of CEO contractual protection is stronger, its 
effect on CEOs’ risk-taking behavior is also more pronounced and its effect on corporate 
decisions is also stronger (Chen et al. 2015).6 It thus follows that the effect of CEO contractual 
protection on the use of debt covenants and interest rate increases with the monetary strength of 
CEO contractual protection. As such, we hypothesize that: 
                                                 
6 We do not examine the incremental effect of the duration of CEO contractual protection because of its low cross-
sectional variation, leading to lower power of test.  
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H4: Ceteris paribus, the effect of CEO contractual protection on the use of debt covenants 
and spread, as hypothesized in H1, H2, and H3, increases with the monetary strength 
of CEO contractual protection. 
 
2.3 Cross-sectional variation 
In this section, we develop predictions for the cross-sectional variation in the effect of CEO 
contractual protection on debt contracting. When developing the main predictions (H1, H2, and 
H3), we argue that CEO contractual protection affects debt contracting because it changes CEOs’ 
risk-taking behavior. Hence, the effect of CEO contractual protection on debt contracting should 
vary systematically with CEOs’ appetite for risk-taking and their opportunities to undertake risky 
projects.  
Some CEOs have a lower appetite for risk-taking than others because of their concerns 
with the adverse effect of increased firm risk on their welfare.7 CEO contractual protection is 
expected to be less effective in inducing these CEOs to undertake risky investments. It then 
follows that the effect of CEO contractual protection on debt contracting will be weaker for the 
CEOs who have a lower appetite for risk-taking. Based on prior research, we identify two types 
of CEOs who have a lower appetite for risk-taking. First, Dechow and Sloan (1991) and Cheng 
(2004) argue that since older CEOs are closer to retirement and have a shorter investment 
horizon, they are less likely to undertake risky investments. Second, prior studies argue that 
longer-tenured CEOs have more firm-specific human capital invested in their firms and are less 
diversified, and thus they are less likely to undertake risky projects in order to reduce firm risk 
(Berger, Ofek and Yermack 1997; Chakraborty, Sheikh and Subramanian 2007). Thus, we have 
the following two predictions.  
                                                 
7 Note that firms might be more likely to use CEO contractual protection to induce CEOs with low risk appetite to 
undertake risky projects. Here we investigate that given the existence of CEO contractual protection, how its effect 
on debt contracting varies with CEOs’ risk appetite.  
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H5: Ceteris paribus, the effect of CEO contractual protection on the use of debt covenants 
and spread, as hypothesized in H1, H2, and H3, is weaker for older CEOs.  
H6: Ceteris paribus, the effect of CEO contractual protection on the use of debt covenants 
and spread, as hypothesized in H1, H2, and H3, is weaker for CEOs with longer 
tenures.  
 
In addition, CEOs’ ability to undertake risky projects depends on the firms’ growth 
opportunities. The impact of CEO contractual protection on CEOs’ risk-taking is thus likely to 
vary with the firm’s growth opportunities. We argue that firms in the growth stage of their life 
cycle have more growth opportunities and greater investment propensity than those in the other 
stages such as mature and declining stages (Hribar and Yehuda 2015). Such firms’ CEOs will 
have more opportunities to undertake risky long-term projects. Hence the effect of CEO 
contractual protection on debt contracting should be stronger for such firms, leading to the 
following hypothesis:  
H7: Ceteris paribus, the effect of CEO contractual protection on the use of debt covenants 
and spread, as hypothesized in H1, H2, and H3, is stronger for firms in the growth 
stage of life-cycle.  
 
3. Sample and research design 
3.1 Sample and data 
The sample for the main analyses includes loans issued by S&P 1500 firms over the 1995-
2008 period. We first hand collect CEO protection information from firms’ proxy statements. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that firms disclose material 
employment agreements and severance pay agreements with top executives in their proxy 
statements (Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 299.601). For each firm-year, we hand collect information 
on such CEO agreements from the proxy statements. There are 18,936 firm-years that have 
proxy statements available from the SEC’s EDGAR online database. We then match these firm-
years with loan issuance data from the DealScan database. We exclude the firm-years without 
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loan data, those from financial firms, and those with missing values for the regression variables. 
For the remaining 4,173 firm-years, we obtain all the loans issued in the sample period. Our final 
sample consists of 6,470 loans. Table 1, Panel A summarizes the sample selection process. 
Table 1, Panel B presents the sample loan distribution by year. In general, the number of 
loans increases from the mid-1990s to 2000s, except the sharp drop right before the financial 
crisis period. Out of the sample loans, 77 percent are issued by firms with CEO contractual 
protection. The percentage of loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection increases 
steadily over time, from around 60 percent in the mid-1990s to more than 80 percent in the last 
several years of the sample period. Note that this pattern reflects the increasing prevalence of 
CEO contractual protection among firms over time (Chen et al. 2015).8 The last two columns of 
the table report the number of loans issued by firms with employment agreements and by those 
with standalone severance pay agreements, respectively, both with an increasing time trend. In 
the main analyses, we combine the two types of agreements together and in an additional 
analysis, we examine their separate effects.9  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the full sample and then separately for loans issued 
by firms with and without CEO protection. Panel A reports descriptive statistics on loan contract 
terms. The average number of financial covenants is 1.50 for the full sample, but it is 
significantly higher for loans issued by firms with CEO protection (1.55) than for loans of firms 
without CEO protection (1.33). This difference is driven by the greater number of performance 
covenants for loans of firms with CEO protection. Consistent with our prediction in H1, these 
loans on average have 17 percent more financial covenants (17% = [1.55-1.33]/1.33) and 25 
                                                 
8 In the empirical analyses, we control for the time trend. The inferences are the same if we control for year fixed 
effects instead. 
9 Note that the employment agreements, which almost always include a termination/severance pay term, and the 
standalone severance pay agreements are mutually exclusive. 
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percent more performance covenants (25% = [1.09-0.87]/0.87) than the other loans. There is no 
difference in the number of capital covenants between the loans issued by these two groups of 
firms. 
With respect to the use of performance pricing provisions, 56% of loans have this term. 
However, 58 percent of loans of firms with CEO protection include this loan contract provision, 
whereas only 51 percent of the other loans do so. The difference of 7 percentage points, or a 15 
percent relative increase is significantly different from zero, consistent with H2. 
We also find that loans of firms with CEO protection on average have a higher loan spread 
(129.91) than the other loans (102.13). The 27.78 basis point difference represents a relative 
increase of 27 percent. This result is consistent with H3. 
Regarding other loan contract terms, we find that loans of firms with CEO protection have 
a slightly longer maturity and a smaller size, and are more likely to be secured, although they are 
less likely to have missing information on loan security.10  
Panel B reports descriptive statistics on firm characteristics. Firms with CEO protection are 
smaller and have a lower market-to-book ratio, higher leverage, lower return on assets, lower z-
score, and lower CEO equity ownership. Due to these differences, we control for all these firm 
characteristics in our multivariate analyses.  
3.2 Research design 
Our hypotheses H1-H3 predict that loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection 
have more financial covenants, are more likely to have performance pricing provisions, and have 
higher loan spreads. To test these predictions, we follow prior literature (e.g., Ortiza-Molina 
2006; Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder 2008; Kim, Song, and Zhang 2011; Christensen and 
                                                 
10 For the sake of completeness, we also examine whether CEO contractual protection affects loan maturity and 
security, but we do not find any significant results.  
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Nikolaev 2012) and use the following regression model:  
ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܨ݁ܽݐݑݎ݁௜,௝,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁ݎ‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜,௧ ൅
	ߛଶܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ_ܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଷܮ݋ܽ݊‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௝,௧ ൅
	ߛସܧܿ݋݊݋݉ݕ‐ݓ݅݀݁_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௧ ൅ ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܶݕ݌݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܲݑݎ݌݋ݏ݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧ ,  (1) 
 
where the dependent variable, Loan_Feature, is one of the three loan features for a loan contract: 
(1) the number of financial covenants (Covenants), (2) the indicator for the loan contracts that 
include performance pricing provisions (Performance_Pricing), and (3) the logged value of loan 
spread (Loan_Spread), which is measured as the drawn all-in spread charged by the bank over 
the LIBOR for the drawn portion of the loan facility, as commonly defined in prior research 
(e.g., Kim et al. 2011). Given the distribution of these three dependent variables, we adopt the 
Poisson, Logit, and OLS regression methods for these three dependent variables, respectively. 
The variable of interest, CEO_Protectioni,t, is an indicator for CEO contractual protection, 
which equals 1 if the CEO has an employment agreement or a standalone severance pay 
agreement, and 0 otherwise. The hypotheses imply that the coefficient on CEO_Protection, β, is 
positive for all three loan features. The standard errors are adjusted for firm clustering.  
We control for the borrower-specific characteristics that prior research has shown affect the 
terms of loan contracts. Prior studies show that debt covenants are more prevalent in the loan 
contracts when the borrowing firms are smaller, less profitable, more levered and have higher 
growth (e.g., Ball, Li, and Shivakumar 2015). Hence, we control for firms’ size (Size), return on 
assets (Return on Assets), leverage (Leverage), and the market-to-book ratio (Market-to-Book). 
In addition, the availability of collateral, as proxied for by the amount of tangible assets, default 
risk, and cash flow volatility, of the borrowers also affect the loan contract terms (e.g., Chava, 
Kumar and Warga 2010; Kim et al. 2011). Consequently, we control for firm’s asset tangibility 
(Tangibility), the modified measure of Altman’s z-score (Z-score), and the volatility of operating 
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cash flows (Cash Flow Volatility).  
Prior studies find that CEOs’ ownership and compensation structure have a direct impact 
on their exposure to risk and hence debt contracting (e.g., Brockman et al. 2010). Therefore, we 
control for CEOs’ ownership and compensation structure. Specifically, we include three 
variables of CEO equity incentives: (1) CEO Equity Compensation, measured as the ratio of the 
values of CEO’s stock and option grants to the CEO’s total compensation; (2) CEO Equity 
Ownership, measured as the total number of the CEO’s stock and option holdings divided by the 
firm’s total number of shares outstanding of this firm; and (3) CEO Portfolio Sensitivity (to stock 
volatility), defined as the change in the value of the CEO’s option portfolio due to a 1% increase 
in the annualized standard deviation of the firm’s stock return.  
The cost of debt and the use of covenants in the loan contracts are also affected by loan 
characteristics. Prior research finds that lenders charge a lower interest rate for shorter-maturity 
loans and larger loan facilities (Graham et al. 2008). Therefore, we include the maturity 
(Loan_Maturity) and size of the loan (Loan_Amount) in the regression. Moreover, because the 
contract terms can affect loan spread, we add four more loan-specific variables to the regression 
model of loan spread: the number of covenants (Number of Covenants), the indicator for 
performance pricing provisions (Performance_Pricing), the indicator for secured loans 
(Secured_Loan), and the indicator for loans with missing information on loan security 
(Secured_Missing). 
Lastly, following prior studies (Kim et al. 2011; Campello and Gao 2015), we also control 
for the potential effect of macroeconomic conditions, by adding the GDP growth (∆GDP) and 
the time trend variable (Time Trend) to the regressions.  
We measure the control variables in the fiscal year immediately before the debt issuance 
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date. Appendix A provides the detailed measurements of all the above variables. For all the 
regressions, we also control for the loan type, loan purpose, and industry fixed effects. Because 
of the inclusion of these fixed effects, we do not report the intercept.  
3.3 Controlling for the endogeneity of CEO contractual protection 
As some firm and CEO characteristics can be correlated with both the use of CEO 
contractual protection and debt contracting (i.e., the use of covenants and spread), we use two 
approaches to address the potential endogeneity of CEO contractual protection. First, in 
Regression (1), we replace the CEO protection indicator with its predicted value estimated from 
a model of the determinants of CEO protection. Second, we add to regression (1) the Inverse 
Mills Ratio estimated from the determinant model (Heckman 1979). Both approaches are widely 
used in the literature to address endogeneity (e.g., Doidge et al. 2004).  
Appendix B discusses the determinant model used to estimate the likelihood of CEO 
contractual protection. The determinants include a number of firm and CEO characteristics and 
five state policy variables that affect the use of CEO contractual protection. As reported in Table 
B-1 and discussed in Appendix B, the results are similar to those reported in prior research (e.g., 
Chen et al. 2015). Note that the state policy variables are exogenous instrumental variables. We 
conduct the tests recommended by Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and find that the state policy 
variables are valid and effective instruments.11 We also follow Larcker and Rusticus’s 
recommendation and report results when the potential endogeneity is not controlled for to ensure 
the robustness of the results.  
                                                 
11 First, the F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the state policy variables are not correlated with the use of CEO 
protection at the 0.001 level. The F-statistic of 30.79 is higher than the recommended critical value of 15.09 in the 
case of five instruments. This suggests that the instruments are effective. Second, the over-identification test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with the second-stage regression residuals. This 
indicates that the instruments are valid (i.e., exogenous). See Larcker and Rusticus (2010) for more detailed 
discussions of these tests.  
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4. Main analyses and cross-sectional tests 
4.1 Results for H1 
In this section, we use Poisson regressions to examine the impact of CEO contractual 
protection on the use of financial covenants in loan contracts. Panel A of Table 3 reports the 
regression results. We first report the regression results without controlling for endogeneity 
(Column (1)). We then report the regression results after controlling for endogeneity by replacing 
the CEO contractual protection indicator with its predicted value in Column (2) and including the 
Inverse Mills Ratio in Column (3).  
Column (1) shows that CEO contractual protection is positively correlated with the number 
of financial covenants (p-value = 0.043). (We use one-sided p-values for variables of interest 
throughout the paper.) The untabulated marginal effect of CEO_Protection suggests that the loan 
contracts for firms with CEO protection have on average 0.089 more financial covenants than 
other firms, or a relative increase of 6.7 percent from the sample average for firms without CEO 
contractual protection (which is 1.33 as reported in Table 2). In Column (2) where we use the 
predicted value for the probability of having CEO protection, the coefficient on CEO contractual 
protection remains significantly positive (p-value = 0.091). In the last column where we include 
the Inverse Mills Ratio, the result for CEO protection is similar with a positive coefficient on 
CEO_Protection (p-value = 0.069). These results are consistent with the argument that when the 
borrowing firm’s CEO is better protected by employment agreements or severance pay 
agreements, the lenders seek for better protection for their loans by adding more financial 
covenants. Overall, these findings are consistent with H1.  
With respect to control variables, we find that the loan contracts contain fewer financial 
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covenants for firms that are larger and have higher growth potential (higher market-to-book 
ratio). On the other hand, the loan contracts contain more financial covenants for firms with 
higher leverage and higher CEO equity ownership. In addition, loans with a larger amount tend 
to include more financial covenants in the loan terms and there is an increasing trend in the use 
of financial covenants. These results are consistent with the findings in prior studies (e.g., 
Christensen and Nikolaev 2012).  
Performance versus capital covenants 
As discussed in Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), the two types of financial covenants, 
performance and capital covenants, limit debt-related agency problems in different ways. 
Performance covenants are based on current performance metrics, which are timely and forward-
looking indicators of negative trends in credit quality. Therefore, performance covenants serve as 
efficient tools to monitor firms’ ongoing performance and provide lenders with options to 
renegotiate or restrain managerial actions when firm performance deteriorates. This type of 
covenants is effective in monitoring the potential adverse consequences of excessive risk taking.  
 In contrast, capital covenants address debt-related agency problems by ensuring that 
shareholders have enough money inside the firm (through limiting the amount of debt, or raising 
additional equity capital, or cutting back on dividends). This type of covenants can ensure that 
there will be enough money left to distribute to debtholders in the case of financial distress and 
that shareholders’ wealth is sensitive to managerial actions in order to incentivize them to 
monitor management. However, since capital covenants are based on cumulated profitability, 
they are less useful in close monitoring of managerial actions and interference with firm 
decisions when necessary.  
As discussed above, with the presence of CEO contractual protection, the main concern for 
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debtholders is that CEOs will be more inclined to take on risky projects. Thus, capital covenants’ 
role will be limited in addressing the impact of CEO protection because they are not breached as 
long as firms maintain adequate amount of equity capital. Hence we do not expect capital 
covenants to differ between firms with and without CEO contractual protection.  
To investigate whether the above predictions hold, we use a similar research design as in 
Panel A of Table 3 when we examine the number of financial covenants. Panel B reports the 
results for the analyses of performance covenants. Panel B, Column (1) shows that CEO 
contractual protection is positively correlated with the number of performance covenants (p-
value = 0.041). The untabulated marginal effect suggests that the loan contracts for firms with 
CEO protection have on average 0.074 more performance covenants than other firms, or a 
relative increase of 8.5 percent from the sample average for firms without CEO contractual 
protection (which is 0.87 as reported in Table 2). In Column (2) of Panel B we use the predicted 
value of the probability of having CEO protection, and find that the coefficient on CEO 
contractual protection remains significantly positive (p-value = 0.030). In the last column where 
we include the Inverse Mills Ratio, the result for CEO protection is similar with a positive 
coefficient on CEO_Protection (p-value = 0.024). These results are consistent with the argument 
that when the borrowing firm’s CEO is better protected by employment agreements or severance 
pay agreements, the lenders seek better protection for their loans by adding more performance 
covenants.  
Panel C of Table 3 reports the results for the analyses of capital covenants. As expected, we 
find that the number of capital covenants in loan contracts does not differ between firms with and 
without CEO contractual protection. This result indicates that private lenders use covenants 
selectively to achieve the goal of monitoring risky investments. This test also helps us further 
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refute an alternative explanation for our results –  debt contracting is affected by high-risk firms 
self-selecting into having CEO contractual protection, not by the CEO contracts per se. Under 
this alternative explanation, the loans issued by firms with CEO protection should have more 
capital covenants than loans issued by other firms. However, we do not observe this result.12 
In sum, we find results consistent with H1 that when the borrowing firm’s CEO is better 
protected by employment agreements or severance pay agreements, the lenders seek better 
protection for their loans by adding more financial covenants. This result is driven by 
performance covenants as they are more effective in constraining managers’ excessive risk-
taking behavior. As such, for the following analyses of covenants, we focus on performance 
covenants only to increase the power of test.  
4.2 Results for H2 
We then examine the impact of CEO contractual protection on the likelihood of including 
performance pricing provisions in the loan contracts. Table 4 reports the regression results. As 
shown in Column (1), CEO protection is positively correlated with the inclusion of performance 
pricing provisions in loan contracts (p-value = 0.016). The effect is also economically 
significant: the untabulated marginal effect of CEO contractual protection is 0.058, a relative 
increase of 11.4 percent from the sample average for firms without CEO contractual protection 
(which is 0.51 as reported in Table 2). The positive correlation still holds after we control for 
endogeneity in both columns (2) and (3) (p-value = 0.001 in both columns).  
The regression results also show that loans are less likely to include performance pricing 
provisions for larger firms and firms with higher growth. With respect to loan characteristics, we 
find that the performance pricing provisions are more likely to be included in loans with a longer 
                                                 
12 An alternative, non-exclusive, explanation for our finding on capital covenants is that the use of capital covenants 
(mostly balance-sheet based) has been less prevalent over time due to the movement to fair value accounting and the 
compromised value of balance sheet numbers for debt contracting (Demerjian 2011).  
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maturity and a larger amount. There is also an increasing trend in the use of performance pricing 
provisions. 
In sum, these findings are consistent with H2 that compared with loans of other firms, 
loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection are more likely to contain performance 
pricing provisions.  
4.3 Results for H3 
Table 5 presents the regression results for loan spread (Loan_Spread) as the dependent 
variable. As reported in Column (1), the coefficient on the indicator for CEO contractual 
protection is significantly positive (p-value = 0.005), consistent with H3. The magnitude of the 
coefficient (0.078) suggests an 8.1% increase in spread for firms with CEO contractual 
protection compared with those without (e0.078=1.081). Combined with the findings in previous 
sections, this result suggests that the lenders, on average, charge a higher cost of debt for firms 
with CEO contractual protection, albeit they use more performance covenants and are more 
likely to include performance pricing provisions in loan contracts. After controlling for 
endogeneity, we continue to find a positive correlation between CEO contractual protection and 
loan spread in columns (2) and (3) (p-value = 0.013 and 0.005, respectively).  
The results on the control variables are generally consistent with prior studies on loan 
pricing (e.g., Graham et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2011). Specifically, we find that loan spread is 
negatively associated with firm size, the market-to-book ratio, return on assets, and z-score, and 
is positively correlated with firms’ leverage and CEO equity ownership. For loan-specific 
variables, we document a lower loan spread for the loans with a longer maturity, a larger amount, 
and more covenants; and a higher loan spread for the loans with performance pricing provisions, 
secured loans, and the loans with missing information on loan security. Moreover, the loan 
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spread is smaller when the macroeconomic conditions are better (i.e., higher GDP growth) and is 
increasing over the sample period.  
In sum, these findings are consistent with H3 that compared with loans of other firms, 
loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection have higher spreads. 
4.4 CEO contractual protection and loan contracting—the monetary strength of protection 
In this section, we report the tests of H4—whether the effect of CEO contractual protection 
on debt contracting increases with its monetary strength. We only tabulate the results using the 
Heckman approach to save space. Note that using the raw or predicted value of the probability of 
CEO protection in the regressions leads to qualitatively similar results.  
Following prior studies (e.g., Rau and Xu 2013; Chen et al. 2015), we measure the 
monetary strength of CEO contractual protection based on the amount of pre-determined 
severance pay in either the employment agreement or the standalone severance pay agreement. 
Specifically, we calculate the severance pay multiple as the ratio of the severance pay to the 
basic salary, and construct an ordinal variable, Strength, to capture the monetary strength of the 
protection.13 If the multiple is above three, we code Strength as 2; if the multiple is between two 
and three, we code Strength as 1; and if the multiple is below two, we code Strength as 0. For 
those loans of firms without CEO contractual protection, we also code Strength as 0. We exclude 
from this analysis those loan observations from firms with CEO contractual protection but 
without information on severance pay.14 We use the following regression to test the incremental 
effect of the monetary strength of CEO contractual protection: 
                                                 
13 Such agreements usually specify the severance pay as a multiple of the basic salary and also allow unexercisable 
options (unvested stocks) to become immediately exercisable (vested). However, the latter portion is difficult to 
quantify ex ante. 
14 Among the loan contracts for firms with CEO contractual protection and information on severance pay, 58.7 
percent have a severance pay multiple above three, 23.0 percent have a severance pay multiple between two and 
three, and 18.3 percent have a severance pay multiple below two.  
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ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܨ݁ܽݐݑݎ݁௜,௝,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൈ ܵݐݎ݁݊݃ݐ݄௜,௧ ൅
ߛଵܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁ݎ‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜,௧ ൅ 	ߛଶܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ_ܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߛଷܮ݋ܽ݊‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௝,௧ ൅ 	ߛସܧܿ݋݊݋݉ݕ‐ݓ݅݀݁_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௧ ൅
ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܶݕ݌݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܲݑݎ݌݋ݏ݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅
ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧ . (2) 
 
Because Strength is 0 for firm-years without CEO contractual protection, CEO_Protection 
× Strength is the same as Strength. As such, the coefficient on CEO_Protection captures the 
difference between firm-years with a low severance pay multiple and those without CEO 
contractual protection. The coefficient on the variable of interest, CEO_Protection × Strength, 
captures the incremental effect of CEO protection with strengthened monetary protection (i.e., 
Strength =1 or 2). We expect a positive coefficient on this interaction term.  
Table 6 presents the regression results for the number of performance covenants in Column 
(1), the use of performance pricing provisions in Column (2), and the loan spreads in Column 
(3). As shown in Table 6, the coefficients on CEO_Protection are positive but only statistically 
significant in Column (2), suggesting that the effect of CEO protection is weak when the 
severance pay multiple is low. Consistent with our expectation, the coefficients on 
CEO_Protection × Strength are significantly positive in all three regressions (p-value = 0.051, 
0.004 and 0.014, respectively), indicating a larger effect of CEO contractual protection for those 
firms with stronger monetary protection in CEOs’ contracts.  
In sum, we find that the effect of CEO contractual protection on loan features increases 
with the monetary strength of the protection. These findings reinforce the inference from the 
main analyses.  
4.5 CEO contractual protection and loan contracting—cross-sectional analyses 
In this section, we report the cross-sectional analyses that test hypotheses H5, H6, and H7. 
We add to the regressions the main effect of the conditional variable and its interaction with the 
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CEO protection indicator. The regression model is as follows:  
ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܨ݁ܽݐݑݎ݁௜,௝,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ_ܸܽݎ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൈ
ܥ݋݊݀݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ_ܸܽݎ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁ݎݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜,௧ ൅
	ߛଶܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ_ܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଷܮ݋ܽ݊‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௝,௧ ൅
	ߛସܧܿ݋݊݋݉ݕ‐ݓ݅݀݁_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௧ ൅ ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܶݕ݌݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܲݑݎ݌݋ݏ݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧ .  (3) 
     
The conditional variable, Conditional_Var, is one of the following three indicator 
variables, Old_CEO, Long_Tenure, or Growth_Stage, corresponding to H5, H6, and H7, 
respectively. Old_CEO equals one if the CEO’s age is 64 or higher, and zero otherwise. 
Long_Tenure equals one if the CEO’s tenure is four years or more, and zero otherwise. (The 
sample median of CEO tenure is four years.) Growth_Stage equals one if the firm-year is in the 
growth stage of the life cycle, and zero otherwise. Following Hribar and Yehuda (2015), we 
create a life-cycle-stage score by summing the standardized values of (1) sales growth, (2) 
capital expenditures, (3) net-capital transactions, and (4) (inverse ranking of) firm age.15 Firm-
years ranked in the top quintile based on the summary score are classified into the growth life-
cycle stage. H5 and H6 predict that the effect of CEO protection on debt contracting is weaker 
for firms with an old CEO and for firms whose CEO’s tenure is long, respectively, whereas H7 
predicts a stronger effect for firms in their growth life-cycle stage. As such, the coefficient on the 
interaction term, ߚ3, is expected to be negative for the tests of H5 and H6 but positive for those 
of H7.  
Table 7 reports the results for the tests of H5. The coefficient on CEO_Protection is 
significantly positive in all three regressions, suggesting that the effect of CEO protection is 
strong when the CEO is relatively young and the contractual protection is expected to induce risk 
taking. However, when the CEO is older and has a weaker appetite to pursue risky projects, the 
                                                 
15 We standardize each variable by subtracting its mean and dividing it by its standard deviation. The calculation 
uses firm-year observations from the Compustat universe during the sample period. For each firm-year, we sum the 
four standardized values together to obtain a summary life-cycle-stage score. 
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effect of CEO protection is attenuated; the coefficient on CEO_Protection ൈ Old_CEO is 
significantly negative in both Columns (1) and (3) where the number of performance covenants 
and loan spreads are examined, respectively (p-value = 0.013 and 0.039, respectively).  
Table 8 reports the results for the tests of H6. The coefficient on CEO_ Protection is 
significantly positive in all three regressions, indicating that the effect of CEO protection is 
strong when the CEO is relatively new to the company. However, when the CEO has served 
longer and his appetite of risk-taking becomes weaker, the effect of CEO protection is weakened; 
the coefficient on CEO_Protection ൈ Long_Tenure is significantly negative in all three 
regressions (p-value = 0.000, 0.026, and 0.087, respectively). 
Table 9 reports the results for the tests of H7. The coefficient on CEO_ Protection is 
insignificant in the three regressions, suggesting that the effect of CEO protection is weak when 
the firm is outside of the growth stage of its life cycle. However, when the firm is in its growth 
stage and hence has more investment opportunities and greater risk-taking propensity, the effect 
of CEO protection is stronger; the coefficient on CEO_Protection ൈ Growth_Stage is 
significantly positive in all three regressions (p-value = 0.004, 0.016, and 0.080, respectively).  
In sum, consistent with our hypotheses, the effect of CEO protection on debt contracting is 
weaker for firms with an old CEO and for firms with a longer-tenured CEO, but is stronger for 
firms in the growth life-cycle stage. These results indicate that the effect of CEO protection on 
debt contracting varies systematically with CEOs’ appetite for risk-taking and CEOs’ risk-taking 
opportunities.  
 
5. Additional tests 
5.1 CEO contractual protection and bond yield spread 
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In this section, we examine the impact of CEO contractual protection on the pricing of 
public bond, i.e., bond yield. This test helps to broaden the scope of study by including public 
debt, and finding consistent results helps to strengthen the inferences based on private debt 
contracting. Consistent with Bharath et al. (2008), we focus on the pricing of public bond and do 
not examine the non-price terms of public debt. Public debt lacks the renegotiation flexibility 
since firms must receive the unanimous consent of public bondholders to alter any of the 
material terms, which makes re-contracting extremely difficult for public debt. In addition, due 
to the small ownership of individual bond holders and free-riding problems, bond holders lack 
the incentives to monitor the firm. Hence we argue that in the case of public debt, the price term 
is the primary contractual feature used to address the riskiness of investments in the presence of 
CEO contractual protection.  
As in prior research on bond yield (e.g., Liao 2015; Pan, Wang, and Weibach 2015), we 
measure bond yield spread as the difference between the offering yield of a bond and the yield of 
treasure bills with similar maturity. This variable is measured in percentage. We use the same list 
of control variables and the same research design as the earlier analyses to be consistent. The 
sample includes 2,201 new bond issuances by the sample firms over the period 1995-2008.  
Table 10 reports the regression results. As expected, the bond yield spread is significantly 
higher for firms with CEO contractual protection than for the other firms when not controlling 
for the potential endogeneity (p-value = 0.053). The coefficient on CEO_Protection in Column 
(1) (0.206) implies that compared to bonds issued by firms without CEO contractual protection, 
those issued by firms with CEO contractual protection have 20.2% higher spread (the average 
bond yield spread is 1.02 percent for firms without CEO contractual protection). The results hold 
after controlling for the endogeneity of CEO contractual protection in columns (2) and (3) (p-
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value = 0.027 and 0.018, respectively).  
In sum, the result based on bonds is consistent with those based on private debt and further 
strengthens the main inference.  
5.2 Switch firms 
While some firms consistently use or do not use CEO protection throughout the sample 
period, other firms switch back and forth (i.e., they have it in some years but not in others). To 
ensure that our results are not driven by the firms that consistently use or do not use CEO 
protection, and to further alleviate the endogeneity concern (by using the same firm as control), 
we examine whether our results hold for the group of firms that switch. The untabulated analysis 
indicates that the results are qualitatively similar.  
In addition, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis using the firms that do not have 
CEO contractual protection in the earlier years and have it in the later years. We find that 
compared to the firms that do not have CEO contractual protection throughout the sample period 
(i.e., control firms), these switch firms experience an increase in the number of performance 
covenants, the likelihood of performance pricing provisions, and spread in their loans.  
Overall, these results confirm the earlier results and strengthen our inferences.  
5.3 Sensitivity tests 
We conduct a series of sensitivity tests to ensure the robustness of our results. For the sake 
of brevity we do not tabulate the results. 
Our inferences remain the same after controlling for the potential effect of corporate 
governance (board independence, E-index, and a founder CEO indicator). The sample size is 
reduced by almost half after the inclusion of these variables. To ensure that the model 
specifications are tractable and comparable with previous research and the results are 
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generalizable, we do not include these variables in the main analyses.  
Our inferences also remain the same after controlling for CEO inside debt for the three 
years when inside debt data is available (2006-2008). We also find that CEO inside debt is 
negatively associated with the number of performance covenants, the likelihood of performance 
pricing provisions, and loan spread. 
In the main analyses, we combine employment agreements and severance pay agreements 
because both types of agreements protect CEOs from short-term performance swings and 
downside risk. In an untabulated analysis, we investigate whether the results apply to both types. 
We construct two indicator variables separately for employment agreements and standalone 
severance pay agreements. We find that both indicators have significantly positive coefficients 
with the exception of the impact of standard alone severance pay agreements on the number of 
performance covenants, indicating that both employment agreements and standalone severance 
pay agreements significantly affect debt contracting. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine whether CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment 
agreements and standalone severance pay agreements, affects debt contracting. CEOs with 
contractual protection are protected from short-term performance swings and downside risk, and 
consequently have stronger incentives to undertake risky projects. Because debtholders do not 
enjoy the upside potential but bear the negative consequences if the risky projects do not pay off, 
rational debtholders will monitor the firms more closely to protect themselves. As such, we 
predict that compared with loans issued by firms without CEO contractual protection, those 
issued by firms with CEO contractual protection have more financial covenants, particularly 
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performance covenants, and are more likely to include performance pricing provisions. If the 
additional covenants and provisions cannot fully address the incremental agency conflict 
between shareholders and debtholders, these loans will also have higher spread.  
Based on 6,470 loans issued by S&P 1500 firms with information on CEO employment 
and severance pay agreements over the period 1995-2008, we document results that are 
consistent with our predictions. We find that CEO contractual protection is associated with a 
higher number of performance covenants, a higher likelihood of performance pricing provisions, 
and higher loan spreads. The effect of CEO contractual protection is both statistically and 
economically significant. We further find that the effect of CEO contractual protection increases 
with the monetary strength of the protection. In cross-sectional tests, we predict and find that the 
effect of CEO contractual protection increases with CEOs’ appetite and opportunities for risk-
taking. In an additional analysis, we also find a higher yield spread for the public bonds issued 
by firms with CEO contractual protection than those issued by firms without CEO contractual 
protection. Our results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables (corporate 
governance and CEO inside debt) and hold for the subset of firms that switch between having 
and not having CEO contractual protection over the sample period. The results also apply to both 
employment agreements and standalone severance pay agreements. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by examining how CEO contractual protection 
affects debt contracting. The findings suggest that CEO contractual protection increases the cost 
of debt. Therefore, our study complements prior studies that investigate how CEO contractual 
protection affects corporate decisions from shareholders’ perspectives and advances the 
emerging literature on CEO contracts.   
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Appendix A 
Variable measurements 
 
Loan contract variables 
   
Financial Covenantsi,t = the number of financial covenants; 
Performance 
Covenantsi,t 
= the number of performance covenants, defined according to Christensen and 
Nikolaev (2012), which include (i) cash interest coverage ratio, (ii) debt 
service coverage ratio, (iii) level of EBITDA, (iv) fixed charge coverage 
ratio, (v) interest coverage ratio, (vi) ratio of debt to EBITDA, and (vii) ratio 
of senior debt to EBITDA; 
Capial Covenantsi,t = the difference between the number of financial covenants and performance 
covenants; 
Performance_Pricingi,t = 1 if the loan facility includes the performance pricing provision, and 0 
otherwise; 
Loan_Spreadi,t = natural logarithm of the drawn all-in spread charged by the bank over the 
LIBOR for the drawn portion of the loan facility; 
Loan Maturityi,t = natural logarithm of the loan maturity in months; 
Loan Amounti,t = natural logarithm of loan facility amount in millions; 
Secured_Loani,t = 1 if the loan facility is secured by collateral, and 0 otherwise; 
Secured_Missingi,t = 1 if the loan security information is not available from the Dealscan 
database, and 0 otherwise; 
Loan Type Fixed  
Effectsi,t 
= indicator variables for loan types, including term loan, revolver greater than 
1 year, revolver less than 1 year, and 364-day facility; 
Loan Purpose Fixed 
Effectsi,t 
= indicator variables for loan purposes, including corporate purposes, debt 
repayment, working capital, and takeover. 
   
CEO contractual protection  
   
CEO_Protectioni,t = indicator for CEO contractual protection, which equals 1 if the CEO has an 
employment agreement or a standalone severance pay agreement, and 0 
otherwise;  
   
Firm characteristics and other variables 
   
Sizei,t-1 = natural logarithm of total assets in millions; 
Market-to-Booki,t-1 = sum of market value of equity and the book value of debt, scaled by total 
assets; 
Leveragei,t-1 = sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt, scaled by total assets; 
Return on Assetsi,t-1 = operating income before depreciation, scaled by total assets; 
Tangibility,t-1 = net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets; 
Cash Flow Volatilityi,t-1 = standard deviation of quarterly cash flows from operations over the 4 fiscal 
years prior to the loan initiation year, scaled by sum of debt in current 
liabilities and long-term debt; 
Z-Scorei,t-1 = modified Altman’s z-score [1.2(Working capital) + 1.4(Retained earnings) + 
3.3(EBIT) + 0.999(Sales), scaled by total assets. Following Graham et al. 
(2008), we do not include the ratio of market value of equity to book value 
of total debt, because a similar term, market-to-book, enters the regressions 
as a separate variable; 
∆GDPi,t  = percent change in GDP in the quarter of loan initiation relative to the same 
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  quarter one year ago; 
Time Trendi,t = linear time trend variable (t – 1995); 
CEO Equity 
Compensationi,t 
= CEOs’ equity-based compensation, calculated as the ratio of the value of 
CEOs’ stock and option grants to their total compensation in year t; 
CEO Equity 
Ownershipi,t 
= CEOs’ equity ownership, calculated as the total number of CEOs’ share and 
option holdings divided by the firm’s total number of shares outstanding; 
CEO Portfolio 
Sensitivityi,t 
= CEOs’ portfolio sensitivity to stock volatility, defined as the change in the 
value of the CEOs’ option portfolio due to a 1% increase in the annualized 
standard deviation of the firm’s stock return; 
Industry fixed effectsi,t = indicator variables for different industries, defined according to Fama and 
French (1997) industry classifications; 
i,t = loan i, year t subscripts.  
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Appendix B 
Determinants of CEO contractual protection  
 
In this appendix, we build on prior research and investigate why some firm-years have CEO 
contractual protection and others do not. Whether a firm has CEO contractual protection is the 
outcome of the bilateral negotiation between the firm and its CEO. We follow previous studies in 
choosing the explanatory variables (Knoeber 1986; Almazan and Suarez 2003; Rusticus 2006; 
Yermack 2006; Gillan et al. 2009; Rau and Xu 2013; Chen et al. 2015). First, when the 
uncertainty over the firm-CEO fit is higher, CEOs are more likely to be replaced and hence are 
more likely to demand contractual protection. Following prior research, we use R&D intensity, 
growth opportunities (proxied by the market-to-book ratio), and performance (proxied by 
market-adjusted returns and ROA) to capture uncertainty in the business environment. We use an 
indicator for outside CEOs to capture CEOs’ lack of experience in running the firm. Second, 
contractual protection is more important for CEOs who have more to lose if being replaced. 
CEOs have more to lose when they have more years until retirement (proxied for by an indicator 
for old CEOs), higher compensation (proxied for by abnormal compensation), or more incentive-
based compensation because unvested options/stocks will be foregone upon the CEO’s 
replacement. Third, one of the benefits of CEO contractual protection for a firm is to address 
CEO short-termism. The benefits are lower when there are alternative ways to do so or when 
CEOs are less likely to be myopic. Prior research shows that CEOs in firms with more 
independent boards (proxied for by board independence) and founder CEOs are less likely to be 
myopic (e.g., Chen et al. 2008; Duchin et al. 2010). Lastly, we also control for leverage and firm 
size (proxied by total assets).  
 
Prior research indicates that the design of employment contracts is influenced by state laws. 
States can adopt one or more of the three commonly used exceptions to limit employers’ ability 
to fire employees at will: public policy, implied contract, good faith and fair dealing (e.g., Muhl 
2001; Autor et al. 2004). Under the “public policy” exception, the employer may not fire the 
employee if the dismissal violates the state’s public policy. Under the “implied contract” policy, 
the employer may not fire the employee if an implied contract is formed between the two parties. 
The “good faith and fair dealing” exception means that employers cannot fire employees in bad 
faith, such as to deprive employees of their benefits. In addition, in states with anti-takeover 
regulations, firms are less likely to be acquired through hostile takeovers. Because CEOs are 
often replaced after hostile takeovers, CEOs in states with anti-takeover regulations are better 
protected from takeover pressure (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 1999, 2003). Garmaise (2011) 
finds that in states where non-competition agreements are better enforced, executive stability 
increases. CEOs are less likely to move to competitors and are also less worried about being 
replaced by executives from competitors. As such, CEOs of the firms in the states with the above 
laws are better protected from dismissal and, as such, the importance of CEO contractual 
protection is lower, leading to a lower likelihood of CEO contractual protection. 
 
We estimate a probit regression of the likelihood of CEO contractual protection on the above 
determinants. Table B-1 provides the variable measurements and regression results. Because 
there is a significant variation in the use of CEO protection across industries, we estimate the 
regressions by industry to improve the goodness of fit of the model. Table B-1 reports the 
average coefficients and their p-values across industries.  
38 
 
 
The results are generally consistent with those reported in prior research (e.g., Chen et al. 2015). 
The likelihood of CEO protection increases with leverage and decreases with performance and 
size; CEO protection is less likely when the CEO is older, when board independence is higher, 
and when the CEO is a founder, and is more likely for CEOs with higher abnormal compensation 
and incentive-based compensation. With respect to the state variables, the likelihood of CEO 
protection is lower in states that provide better protection to employees and have anti-takeover 
regulations.  
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TABLE B-1 
Determinants of the use of CEO contractual protection 
  
This table reports the results from the probit regressions that explain the likelihood of a firm having CEO 
contractual protection (i.e., having an employment agreement or a standalone severance pay agreement 
with the CEO). The sample includes 8,343 firm-years from S&P 1500 firms in the 1995-2008 period. We 
require that the proxy statement is available from EDGAR and data are available to calculate the 
regression variables. (The sample size is larger than that in the main analyses because here we do not 
require loan data for these firm-years). The probit regression is estimated by industry (based on Fama and 
French (1997) industry definitions). We report the average coefficients and marginal effects across 
industries and the p-values are calculated based on the coefficient estimates across industries. P-values are 
one-sided for variables with predicted signs and two-sided otherwise. The marginal effect is calculated as 
the change in the probability of having CEO contractual protection, when there is a change of one 
standard deviation in the continuous explanatory variables (or a change from 0 to 1 in the indicator 
variables), with other explanatory variables taking the value of the sample means. The variables are 
measured as follows: 
	
Firm and CEO characteristics  
R&D Intensity = R&D expenditures divided by sales, and set as zero for missing values;  
Market-to-book ratio = market value of equity divided by book value of equity; 
Market-adjusted returns = market-adjusted cumulative stock returns over the year;  
ROA = return on assets, measured as net income over total assets; 
Outside CEO = 1 if the CEO was appointed to the CEO position within one year after 
joining the firm, and 0 otherwise; 
Old CEO = 1 if the CEO is 64 years or older, and 0 otherwise; 
Abnormal compensation = abnormal CEO cash compensation, measured as the residual from a 
model that regresses the logarithm of CEO cash compensation on the 
logarithm of firm assets, ROA, the market-to-book ratio, CEO tenure, 
and industry and year indicators, as in Gillan et al. (2009); 
Incentive-based compensation = the ratio of the value of the CEO’s stock and option grants to the CEO’s 
total compensation; 
Board independence = 1 if the percentage of independent directors sitting on the board is higher 
than the sample median, and 0 otherwise;  
Founder CEO = 1 if the CEO is one of the founders of the firm, and 0 otherwise;  
Leverage = total debt divided by total assets; 
Assets = logarithm of total assets (in millions); 
State policy variables  
Public policy = 1 for firms with headquarters in the states that have a public policy 
exception for employment at will, and 0 otherwise; 
Implied contract = 1 for firms with headquarters in the states that have an implied contract 
exception for employment at will, and 0 otherwise; 
Good faith and fair dealing = 1 for firms with headquarters in the states that have a good faith and fair 
dealing exception for employment at will, and 0 otherwise; 
Anti-takeover regulations = 1 for firms with headquarters in the states that have business combination 
laws (Bertrand and Mullainathan 1999), and 0 otherwise; 
Garmaise index = the state-level enforcement index of non-competition agreements, as 
constructed by Garmaise (2011). 
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TABLE B-1 (Cont’d) 
  
 Pred. signs  Coef. P-value Marginal effect  
Intercept   2.972 0.168  
 
Firm and CEO characteristics      
R&D intensity +  27.797 0.132 0.022 
Market-to-book ratio +  -0.017 0.510 -0.018 
Market-adjusted returns –  -0.133 0.210 -0.028 
ROA –  -3.402 0.085 -0.029 
Outside CEO +  0.804 0.001 0.167 
Old CEO –  -1.022 <.0001 -0.139 
Abnormal compensation +  1.121 0.000 0.063 
Incentive-based compensation +  1.691  <.0001 0.049 
Board independence –  -0.620  <.0001 -0.078 
Founder CEO –  -1.128 0.006 -0.168 
Leverage ?  1.357 0.000 0.097 
Assets ?  -0.285 0.040 -0.098 
 
State policy variables      
Public policy –  0.144 0.512 0.025 
Implied contract –  -0.914 0.044 -0.123 
Good faith and fair dealing –  -1.501 0.005 -0.206 
Anti-takeover regulations –  -0.635 0.035 -0.084 
Garmaise index –  -0.068 0.286 -0.027 
      
# of observations   8,343   
# of industries   40   
Average pseudo R2   0.498   
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TABLE 1  
Sample selection, composition, and descriptive statistics  
	
This table reports the sample selection, composition, and descriptive statistics for our sample of 6,470 
loans issued by the S&P 1500 firms with proxy statements from EDGAR in the 1995-2008 period.  
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
  Sample size
  
Firm-years with proxy statements available from EDGAR for S&P 1500 
firms in the 1995-2008 period  18,936
  
Less:  
  
Firm-years without loan information from DealScan 12,643 
  
Firm-years of financial firms 735 
  
Firm-years without Compustat data to calculate the regression variables 1,385 
  
Firm-years with required data  4,173
Number of loans issued by the sample firms  6,470
 
Panel B: Yearly distribution  
     Type of CEO protection 
 
 
Year 
# of 
loans 
 
(A) 
# of loans issued 
by firms with 
CEO protection 
(B) 
Percentage 
 
 
(B)/(A) 
 # of loans issued 
by firms with 
employment 
agreements 
# of loans issued by 
firms with 
standalone severance 
pay agreements 
1995 217 136 62.7%  65 71 
1996 284 173 60.9%  99 74 
1997 373 251 67.3%  144 107 
1998 364 235 64.6%  142 93 
1999 417 292 70.0%  192 100 
2000 487 358 73.5%  222 136 
2001 613 478 78.0%  298 180 
2002 591 475 80.4%  274 201 
2003 621 505 81.3%  326 179 
2004 647 525 81.1%  310 215 
2005 625 503 80.5%  321 182 
2006 489 412 84.3%  249 163 
2007 482 416 86.3%  231 185 
2008 260 226 86.9%  118 108 
       
Total 6,470 4,985 77.0%  2,991 1,994 
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive Statistics: Full Sample and Separately for Loans of Firms with and without CEO Protection 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics on loan contract terms and firm characteristics for our sample of 6,470 loans issued by S&P 1500 firms in 
the 1995-2008 period, and then separately for loans issued by firms with and those without CEO contractual protection. Panel A reports 
descriptive statistics on loan contract terms. Panel B reports descriptive statistics on firm characteristics for the sample firms that issued these 
loans. Please see Appendix A for variable measurement. *, ** denote a significant difference in the mean/median for loans of firms with and 
without CEO protection at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 Full Sample 
 
(N=6,470) 
Loans issued by firms 
with CEO protection 
(N=4,985) 
Loans issued by firms 
without CEO protection 
(N=1,485) 
 Mean Median Std Dev. Mean Median Std Dev. Mean Median Std Dev. 
Panel A: Loan contract terms          
Number of Financial Covenants 1.50 2.00 1.36 1.55 2.00 1.34 1.33** 1.00** 1.41 
Performance Covenants 1.04 1.00 1.10 1.09 1.00 1.10 0.87** 0.00** 1.08 
Capital Covenants 0.46 0.00 0.69 0.46 0.00 0.67 0.46 0.00 0.75 
Performance_Pricing  0.56 1.00 0.50 0.58 1.00 0.49 0.51** 1.00** 0.50 
Loan spread (basis points) 123.54 87.50 105.80 129.91 100.00 108.01 102.13** 65.00** 94.95 
Log(spread) (Loan_Spread) 4.44 4.47 0.90 4.52 4.61 0.87 4.20** 4.17** 0.94 
Loan maturity (months) 43.16 50.00 24.08 43.40 52.00 23.38 42.35 48.00 26.29 
Log(maturity) (Loan Maturity) 3.54 3.91 0.76 3.55 3.95 0.75 3.49** 3.87 0.78 
Loan amount ($million) 484.31 250.00 657.11 460.26 250.00 623.95 565.02** 275.00** 752.55 
Log(loan amount) (Loan Amount) 5.48 5.52 1.26 5.46 5.52 1.23 5.56** 5.62** 1.35 
Secured_Loan  0.33 0.00 0.47 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.27** 0.00** 0.44 
Secured_Missing 0.37 0.00 0.48 0.34 0.00 0.47 0.46** 0.00** 0.50 
          
Panel B: Firm characteristics           
Total assets ($million) 7544 2210 15650 6736 2112 13617 10258** 2548** 20867 
Log of total assets (Size) 7.80 7.70 1.51 7.74 7.66 1.47 7.99** 7.84** 1.64 
Market-to-Book  1.87 1.56 0.96 1.81 1.51 0.93 2.07** 1.73** 1.04 
Leverage 0.28 0.27 0.16 0.29 0.28 0.16 0.27** 0.26** 0.16 
Return on Assets 0.15 0.14 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.07 0.16** 0.16** 0.07 
Tangibility 0.34 0.29 0.21 0.34 0.28 0.22 0.34 0.31** 0.20 
Cash Flow Volatility 1.50 0.19 5.67 1.46 0.18 5.63 1.64 0.21** 5.82 
Z-score 1.94 1.88 1.08 1.87 1.80 1.08 2.18** 2.11** 1.06 
CEO Equity Compensation 0.45 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.47 0.28 0.44 0.45 0.31 
CEO Equity Ownership 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04** 0.01** 0.06 
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity 4.22 4.35 1.58 4.24 4.35 1.50 4.15 4.32 1.82 
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TABLE 3 
CEO contractual protection and financial covenants of loan contracts 
 
This table reports results from the following Poisson regression of the number of covenants: 
 
ܥ݋ݒ݁݊ܽ݊ݐݏ௜,௝,௧ ൌ
ߙ ൅ ߚܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁ݎ‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜,௧ ൅ 	ߛଶܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ_ܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߛଷܮ݋ܽ݊‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௝,௧ ൅ 	ߛସܧܿ݋݊݋݉ݕ‐ݓ݅݀݁_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௧ ൅ ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܶݕ݌݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܲݑݎ݌݋ݏ݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅
ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧ , 
 
where Covenants is the total number of covenants and is measured in three alternative ways: the total number of financial covenants in Panel A, 
the number of performance covenants in Panel B, and the number of capital covenants in Panel C. CEO_Protection is an indicator for CEO 
contractual protection; it equals 1 if the CEO has an employment agreement or a standalone severance pay agreement, and 0 otherwise. See 
Appendix A for the measurement of the control variables. In Column (1) of each panel, we report the Poisson regression of the above equation. In 
Column (2) of each panel, we replace CEO_Protection with its predicted value estimated from the first-stage regression and report the Poisson 
regression results. In Column (3) of each panel, we add to the Poisson regression model the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated from the first-stage 
regression. See Appendix B for details on the first-stage regression. The sample includes 6,470 loans issued by S&P 1500 firms over the period 
1995-2008. The sample size is smaller for columns (2) and (3) due to the additional data requirement for first-stage regression. The p-values are 
based on standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. The p-values are one-sided for CEO_Protection and two-sided otherwise. 
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TABLE 3 (Cont’d) 
Panel A: Analysis of financial covenants 
  
(1) 
Using the raw value of  
CEO contractual protection  
(2) 
Using the predicted value 
of CEO protection  
(3) 
Using the Heckman 
approach 
 Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.070 0.043   0.083 0.091   0.096 0.069  
Size  -0.296 0.000   -0.310 0.000   -0.308 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.119 0.000   -0.122 0.000   -0.121 0.000  
Leverage  0.451 0.000   0.424 0.002   0.425 0.002  
Return on Assets  0.405 0.212   0.328 0.374   0.324 0.381  
Tangibility  -0.096 0.392   -0.112 0.404   -0.104 0.435  
Cash Flow Volatility  0.003 0.253   0.003 0.363   0.003 0.340  
Z-score  -0.013 0.581   -0.016 0.536   -0.015 0.558  
CEO Equity Compensation  -0.063 0.231   -0.047 0.419   -0.046 0.428  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.711 0.015   0.658 0.084   0.736 0.051  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   0.015 0.219   0.017 0.233   0.016 0.267  
Loan Maturity  -0.044 0.186   -0.066 0.091   -0.065 0.093  
Loan Amount  0.124 0.000   0.142 0.000   0.141 0.000  
∆GDP  1.337 0.198   0.901 0.425   0.940 0.406  
Time Trend  0.012 0.020   0.009 0.180   0.009 0.188  
Inverse Mills Ratio          -0.026 0.509  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
 
N  6,470  5,388    5,388   
Pseudo R2  0.124  0.122    0.122   
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TABLE 3 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Analysis of performance covenants 
  
(1) 
Using the raw value of  
CEO contractual protection  
(2) 
Using the predicted value 
of CEO protection  
(3) 
Using the Heckman 
approach 
 Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.092 0.041   0.155 0.030   0.169 0.024  
Size  -0.334 0.000   -0.349 0.000   -0.348 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.114 0.000   -0.105 0.003   -0.104 0.003  
Leverage  0.785 0.000   0.808 0.000   0.808 0.000  
Return on Assets  0.609 0.149   0.341 0.482   0.339 0.486  
Tangibility  -0.379 0.008   -0.467 0.007   -0.458 0.008  
Cash Flow Volatility  0.005 0.055   0.005 0.139   0.005 0.125  
Z-score  -0.044 0.111   -0.021 0.494   -0.020 0.506  
CEO Equity Compensation  -0.134 0.037   -0.115 0.120   -0.114 0.123  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.446 0.238   0.442 0.360   0.539 0.263  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   0.036 0.029   0.039 0.041   0.038 0.050  
Loan Maturity  0.080 0.036   0.057 0.194   0.057 0.192  
Loan Amount  0.135 0.000   0.146 0.000   0.145 0.000  
∆GDP  0.828 0.484   0.651 0.622   0.704 0.594  
Time Trend  0.044 0.000   0.040 0.000   0.040 0.000  
Inverse Mills Ratio          -0.060 0.264  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
 
N  6,470  5,388    5,388   
Pseudo R2  0.155  0.156    0.156   
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TABLE 3 (Cont’d) 
Panel C: Analysis of capital covenants 
  
(1) 
Using the raw value of  
CEO contractual protection  
(2) 
Using the predicted value 
of CEO protection  
(3) 
Using the Heckman 
approach 
 Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.045 0.270   -0.060 0.690   -0.043 0.639  
Size  -0.196 0.000   -0.197 0.000   -0.195 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.138 0.001   -0.166 0.001   -0.164 0.001  
Leverage  -0.525 0.029   -0.643 0.019   -0.638 0.020  
Return on Assets  -0.302 0.592   -0.018 0.977   -0.026 0.967  
Tangibility  0.644 0.004   0.727 0.004   0.737 0.004  
Cash Flow Volatility  -0.004 0.326   -0.004 0.463   -0.004 0.477  
Z-score  0.073 0.100   0.015 0.776   0.017 0.750  
CEO Equity Compensation  0.107 0.215   0.103 0.283   0.104 0.274  
CEO Equity Ownership  1.220 0.037   1.174 0.065   1.262 0.048  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   -0.017 0.500   -0.017 0.535   -0.018 0.501  
Loan Maturity  -0.323 0.000   -0.351 0.000   -0.350 0.000  
Loan Amount  0.083 0.005   0.112 0.001   0.112 0.001  
∆GDP  2.889 0.082   1.846 0.300   1.882 0.291  
Time Trend  -0.065 0.000   -0.065 0.000   -0.065 0.000  
Inverse Mills Ratio          0.057 0.469  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
 
N  6,470  5,388    5,388   
Pseudo R2  0.103  0.099    0.099   
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TABLE 4 
CEO contractual protection and performance pricing provisions in loan contracts 
 
This table reports results from the following Logit regression of the likelihood of including the performance pricing provisions in loan contracts 
(Performance_Pricing): 
 
ܲݎ݋ܾሺܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁_ܲݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃௜,௝,௧ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁ݎ‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜,௧ ൅ 	ߛଶܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ_ܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߛଷܮ݋ܽ݊‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௝,௧ ൅ 	ߛସܧܿ݋݊݋݉ݕ‐ݓ݅݀݁_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௧ ൅ ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܶݕ݌݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅
ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܲݑݎ݌݋ݏ݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧ ,  
 
where Performance_Pricing is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the loan contract includes the performance pricing provision, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO_Protection is an indicator for CEO contractual protection; it equals 1 if the CEO has an employment agreement or a standalone severance 
pay agreement and 0 otherwise. See Appendix A for the measurement of the control variables. In Column (1), we report the Logit regression of the 
above equation. In Column (2), we replace CEO_Protection with its predicted value estimated from the first-stage regression and report the Logit 
regression results. In Column (3), we add to the Logit regression model the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated from the first-stage regression. See 
Appendix B for details on the first-stage regression. The sample includes 6,470 loans issued by S&P 1500 firms over the period 1995-2008. The 
sample size is smaller for columns (2) and (3) due to the additional data requirement of the first-stage regression. The p-values are based on 
standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. The p-values are one-sided for CEO_Protection and two-sided otherwise. 
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TABLE 4 (Cont’d) 
 
  
(1) 
Using the raw value of  
CEO contractual protection  
(2) 
Using the predicted value of 
CEO protection  
(3) 
Using the Heckman 
approach 
 Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.236 0.016   0.527 0.001   0.559 0.001  
Size  -0.414 0.000   -0.397 0.000   -0.393 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.197 0.002   -0.193 0.005   -0.186 0.006  
Leverage  0.031 0.931   0.002 0.997   0.015 0.970  
Return on Assets  1.372 0.142   1.561 0.120   1.520 0.130  
Tangibility  0.219 0.513   -0.159 0.667   -0.128 0.730  
Cash Flow Volatility  -0.005 0.455   -0.005 0.524   -0.005 0.536  
Z-score  0.074 0.258   0.053 0.483   0.057 0.449  
CEO Equity Compensation  0.029 0.836   0.132 0.389   0.136 0.378  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.415 0.691   1.771 0.144   2.016 0.102  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   0.016 0.654   0.003 0.948   -0.001 0.989  
Loan Maturity  0.187 0.036   0.176 0.078   0.178 0.075  
Loan Amount  0.432 0.000   0.436 0.000   0.436 0.000  
∆GDP  -3.666 0.144   -2.267 0.389   -2.168 0.410  
Time Trend  0.026 0.061   0.028 0.085   0.027 0.090  
Inverse Mills Ratio          -0.234 0.046  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
 
N  6,470  5,388    5,388   
Pseudo R2  0.145  0.152    0.152   
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TABLE 5 
CEO contractual protection and loan spread 
 
This table reports results from the following OLS regression of the all-in spread (Loan_Spread): 
 
ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜,௝,௧ ൌ
ߙ ൅ ߚܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁ݎ‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜,௧ ൅ 	ߛଶܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ_ܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߛଷܮ݋ܽ݊‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௝,௧ ൅ 	ߛସܧܿ݋݊݋݉ݕ‐ݓ݅݀݁_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௧ ൅ ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܶݕ݌݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܲݑݎ݌݋ݏ݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅
ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧ ,  
 
where Loan_Spread is the natural logarithm of loan spread, which is the drawn all-in spread charged by the bank over the LIBOR for the drawn 
portion of the loan facility. CEO_Protection is an indicator for CEO contractual protection; it equals 1 if the CEO has an employment agreement 
or a standalone severance pay agreement and 0 otherwise. See Appendix A for the measurement of the control variables. For the loan-specific 
control variables, in additional to loan maturity and loan amount, we add four more variables: the total number of all covenants (Number of 
Covenants), an indicator for performance pricing provisions (Performance_Pricing), an indicator for secured loans (Secured_Loan), and an 
indicator for loans without loan security information (Secured_Missing). In Column (1), we report the OLS regression results of the above 
equation. In Column (2), we replace CEO_Protection with its predicted value estimated from the first-stage regression and report the OLS 
regression results. In Column (3), we add to the OLS regression model the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated from the first-stage regression. See 
Appendix B for details on the first-stage regression. The sample includes 6,470 loans issued by S&P 1500 firms over the period 1995-2008. The 
sample size is smaller for columns (2) and (3) due to the additional data requirement of first-stage regression. The p-values are based on standard 
errors adjusted for firm clustering. The p-values are one-sided for CEO_Protection and two-sided otherwise. 
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TABLE 5 (Cont’d) 
  
(1) 
Using the raw value of  
CEO contractual protection  
(2) 
Using the predicted value of 
CEO protection  
(3) 
Using the Heckman 
approach 
 Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.078 0.005   0.099 0.013   0.115 0.005  
Size  -0.118 0.000   -0.113 0.000   -0.112 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.099 0.000   -0.106 0.000   -0.103 0.000  
Leverage  0.808 0.000   0.784 0.000   0.788 0.000  
Return on Assets  -1.152 0.000   -1.052 0.000   -1.066 0.000  
Tangibility  -0.084 0.346   -0.087 0.371   -0.075 0.443  
Cash Flow Volatility  0.003 0.122   0.002 0.282   0.003 0.261  
Z-score  -0.070 0.000   -0.088 0.000   -0.086 0.000  
CEO Equity Compensation  0.069 0.055   0.051 0.180   0.053 0.168  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.904 0.000   0.981 0.000   1.082 0.000  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   -0.001 0.903   0.001 0.950   -0.001 0.942  
Loan Maturity  -0.097 0.000   -0.101 0.000   -0.101 0.000  
Loan Amount  -0.132 0.000   -0.141 0.000   -0.141 0.000  
Number of Covenants  -0.084 0.000   -0.087 0.001   -0.088 0.000  
Performance_Pricing  0.084 0.000   0.094 0.000   0.094 0.000  
Secured_Loan  0.524 0.000   0.523 0.000   0.524 0.000  
Secured_Missing  0.096 0.000   0.084 0.001   0.086 0.000  
∆GDP  -3.864 0.000   -4.008 0.000   -3.975 0.000  
Time Trend  0.025 0.000   0.024 0.000   0.024 0.000  
Inverse Mills Ratio          -0.030 0.330  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
N  6,470  5,388    5,388   
Adj. R2  0.675  0.685    0.517   
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TABLE 6 
CEO contractual protection and debt contracts –  
The incremental effect of the monetary strength of CEO Protection  
 
This table reports results from the following regression:  
 
ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܨ݁ܽݐݑݎ݁௜,௝,௧ ൌ
ߙ ൅ ߚଵܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൈ ܵݐݎ݁݊݃ݐ݄௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁ݎ‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜,௧ ൅
	ߛଶܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ_ܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଷܮ݋ܽ݊‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௝,௧ ൅ 	ߛସܧܿ݋݊݋݉ݕ‐ݓ݅݀݁_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௧ ൅
ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܶݕ݌݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܲݑݎ݌݋ݏ݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧ ,    
 
where the dependent variable, Loan_Feature, is one of the three loan contract variables: (1) the number of performance covenants (Performance 
Covenants); (2) an indicator for the loan contracts that include performance pricing provisions (Performance_Pricing); and (3) the natural 
logarithm of loan spread (Loan_Spread), which is measured by the drawn all-in spread charged by the bank over the LIBOR for the drawn portion 
of the loan facility. The Poisson regression, Logit regression, and OLS regression methods are used for the three dependent variables, respectively. 
CEO_Protection is an indicator for CEO contractual protection; it equals 1 if the CEO has an employment agreement or a standalone severance 
pay agreement, and 0 otherwise. Strength is an ordinal variable for the strength of the contractual protection; it equals 2 if the severance pay 
multiple—how many times the severance pay is relative to the basic salary—is above three, 1 if the multiple is between two and three, and 0 if the 
multiple is below two. CEO_Protection and Strength equal zero for CEOs without contractual protection. Firm-years with CEO contractual 
protection but without information on severance pay are excluded from the analyses. See Appendix A for the measurement of control variables. 
We add to the regressions the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the first-stage regression to control for the endogeneity of CEO contractual 
protection. See Appendix B for details of the first-stage regression. The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. The 
sample includes 5,267 loans issued by S&P 1500 firms that have detailed information on the strength of the CEO protection over the 1995-2008 
period. The p-values are one-sided for CEO_Protection and CEO_Protection × Strength, and two-sided otherwise.  
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TABLE 6 (Cont’d) 
  
(1) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance Covenants  
(2) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance_Pricing  
(3) 
Dep. Var = 
Loan_Spread 
 Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.105 0.135   0.313 0.054   0.057 0.135  
CEO_Protection × Strength  0.048 0.051   0.178 0.004   0.038 0.014  
Size  -0.351 0.000   -0.416 0.000   -0.112 <.0001  
Market-to-Book  -0.101 0.005   -0.185 0.008   -0.103 <.0001  
Leverage  0.823 0.000   -0.067 0.867   0.773 <.0001  
Return on Assets  0.293 0.565   1.148 0.259   -1.050 0.000  
Tangibility  -0.473 0.007   -0.106 0.777   -0.082 0.406  
Cash Flow Volatility  0.005 0.113   -0.006 0.464   0.002 0.275  
Z-score  -0.023 0.468   0.053 0.495   -0.086 <.0001  
CEO Equity Compensation  -0.108 0.154   0.147 0.348   0.056 0.158  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.563 0.255   2.052 0.100   1.060 <.0001  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   0.033 0.100   0.005 0.900   -0.003 0.796  
Loan Maturity  0.047 0.283   0.172 0.091   -0.099 0.000  
Loan Amount  0.144 0.000   0.441 0.000   -0.142 <.0001  
Number of Covenants          -0.084 0.001  
Performance_Pricing          0.093 <.0001  
Secured_Loan          0.539 <.0001  
Secured_Missing          0.093 0.000  
∆GDP  0.789 0.556   -3.434 0.200   -3.938 <.0001  
Time Trend  0.040 0.000   0.025 0.132   0.023 <.0001  
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.062 0.253   -0.237 0.044   -0.027 0.384  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
N  5,267  5,267    5,267   
Pseudo R2 (Adj. R2)  0.158  0.156    0.685   
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TABLE 7 
CEO contractual protection and debt contracts –  
Cross-sectional analyses – Old CEO 
 
This table reports results from the following regression:  
 
ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܨ݁ܽݐݑݎ݁௜,௝,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܱ݈݀_ܥܧ ௜ܱ,௧ ൅ ߚଷܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൈ ܱ݈݀_ܥܧ ௜ܱ,௧ ൅ ߛଵܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁ݎݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜,௧ ൅
	ߛଶܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ_ܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଷܮ݋ܽ݊‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௝,௧ ൅ 	ߛସܧܿ݋݊݋݉ݕ‐ݓ݅݀݁_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௧ ൅
ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܶݕ݌݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܲݑݎ݌݋ݏ݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧ ,      
 
where the dependent variable, Loan_Feature, is one of the three loan contract variables: (1) the number of performance covenants (Performance 
Covenants); (2) an indicator for the loan contracts that include performance pricing provisions (Performance_Pricing); and (3) the natural 
logarithm of loan spread (Loan_Spread), which is measured by the drawn all-in spread charged by the bank over the LIBOR for the drawn portion 
of the loan facility. The Poisson regression, Logit regression, and OLS regression methods are used for the three dependent variables, respectively. 
CEO_Protection is an indicator for CEO contractual protection; it equals 1 if the CEO has an employment agreement or a standalone severance 
pay agreement, and 0 otherwise. Old_CEO equals 1 if the CEO’s age is 64 or higher, and 0 otherwise. See Appendix A for the measurement of 
control variables. We add to the regressions the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the first-stage regression to control for the endogeneity of CEO 
contractual protection. See Appendix B for details of the first-stage regression. The sample includes 5,388 loans issued by S&P 1500 firms over 
the period 1995-2008. The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. The p-values are one-sided for CEO_Protection and 
the interaction term, and two-sided otherwise.  
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TABLE 7 (Cont’d) 
  
(1) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance Covenants  
(2) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance_Pricing  
(3) 
Dep. Var = 
Loan_Spread 
 Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.196 0.016   0.534 0.001   0.143 0.001  
CEO_Protection × Old_CEO  -0.347 0.013   0.223 0.239   -0.167 0.039  
Old_CEO  0.072 0.532   -0.099 0.681   0.152 0.039  
Size  -0.346 0.000   -0.394 0.000   -0.112 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.103 0.003   -0.187 0.006   -0.103 0.000  
Leverage  0.801 0.000   0.018 0.964   0.781 0.000  
Return on Assets  0.332 0.493   1.519 0.132   -1.045 0.000  
Tangibility  -0.449 0.010   -0.142 0.703   -0.066 0.503  
Cash Flow Volatility  0.005 0.127   -0.005 0.537   0.003 0.257  
Z-score  -0.019 0.544   0.056 0.457   -0.087 0.000  
CEO Equity Compensation  -0.119 0.105   0.135 0.382   0.057 0.141  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.518 0.290   2.075 0.090   0.976 0.000  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   0.039 0.047   -0.001 0.976   0.000 0.984  
Loan Maturity  0.058 0.187   0.178 0.075   -0.102 0.000  
Loan Amount  0.143 0.000   0.437 0.000   -0.141 0.000  
Number of Covenants          -0.086 0.001  
Performance_Pricing          0.094 0.000  
Secured_Loan          0.526 0.000  
Secured_Missing          0.088 0.000  
∆GDP  0.799 0.543   -2.236 0.396   -3.945 0.000  
Time Trend  0.039 0.000   0.027 0.089   0.024 0.000  
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.057 0.288   -0.235 0.046   -0.032 0.295  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
N  5,388  5,388    5,388   
Pseudo R2 (Adj. R2)  0.157  0.153    0.686   
55 
 
TABLE 8 
CEO contractual protection and debt contracts –  
Cross-sectional analyses – CEO tenure 
 
This table reports results from the following regression:  
 
ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܨ݁ܽݐݑݎ݁௜,௝,௧ ൌ
ߙ ൅ ߚଵܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܮ݋݊݃_ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൈ ܮ݋݊݃_ܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁௜,௧ ൅
ߛଵܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁ݎݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜,௧ ൅ 	ߛଶܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ_ܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଷܮ݋ܽ݊‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௝,௧ ൅
	ߛସܧܿ݋݊݋݉ݕ‐ݓ݅݀݁_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௧ ൅ ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܶݕ݌݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܲݑݎ݌݋ݏ݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧ ,  
         
where the dependent variable, Loan_Feature, is one of the three loan contract variables: (1) the number of performance covenants (Performance 
Covenants); (2) an indicator for the loan contracts that include performance pricing provisions (Performance_Pricing); and (3) the natural 
logarithm of loan spread (Loan_Spread), which is measured by the drawn all-in spread charged by the bank over the LIBOR for the drawn portion 
of the loan facility. The Poisson regression, Logit regression, and OLS regression methods are used for the three dependent variables, respectively. 
CEO_Protection is an indicator for CEO contractual protection; it equals 1 if the CEO has an employment agreement or a standalone severance 
pay agreement, and 0 otherwise. Long_Tenure equals 1 if the CEO’s tenure is four years or more, and 0 otherwise. See Appendix A for the 
measurement of control variables. We add to the regressions the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the first-stage regression to control for the 
endogeneity of CEO contractual protection. See Appendix B for details of the first-stage regression. The sample includes 5,329 loans issued by 
S&P 1500 firms over the period 1995-2008. The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. The p-values are one-sided for 
CEO_Protection and the interaction term, and two-sided otherwise.  
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TABLE 8 (Cont’d) 
  
(1) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance Covenants  
(2) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance_Pricing  
(3) 
Dep. Var = 
Loan_Spread 
 Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.269 0.004   0.767 0.000   0.116 0.016  
CEO_Protection × Long_Tenure  -0.405 0.000   -0.403 0.026   -0.078 0.087  
Long_Tenure  0.014 0.873   0.229 0.211   -0.062 0.214  
Size  -0.341 0.000   -0.389 0.000   -0.116 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.095 0.004   -0.188 0.006   -0.105 0.000  
Leverage  0.759 0.000   0.000 0.999   0.789 0.000  
Return on Assets  0.346 0.443   1.473 0.145   -1.055 0.000  
Tangibility  -0.487 0.005   -0.129 0.729   -0.075 0.441  
Cash Flow Volatility  0.005 0.142   -0.005 0.508   0.002 0.385  
Z-score  -0.011 0.712   0.064 0.402   -0.085 0.000  
CEO Equity Compensation  -0.126 0.074   0.142 0.365   0.033 0.390  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.601 0.199   1.873 0.142   1.196 0.000  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   0.052 0.011   0.009 0.815   0.006 0.583  
Loan Maturity  0.064 0.127   0.177 0.080   -0.099 0.000  
Loan Amount  0.147 0.000   0.435 0.000   -0.142 0.000  
Number of Covenants          -0.082 0.001  
Performance_Pricing          0.085 0.000  
Secured_Loan          0.495 0.000  
Secured_Missing          0.082 0.001  
∆GDP  0.840 0.506   -2.098 0.428   -3.889 0.000  
Time Trend  0.040 0.000   0.026 0.110   0.024 0.000  
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.033 0.556   -0.232 0.051   -0.017 0.589  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
N  5,329  5,329    5,329   
Pseudo R2 (Adj. R2)  0.164  0.153    0.691   
 
 
TABLE 9 
CEO contractual protection and debt contracts –  
Cross-sectional analyses – Firm life-cycle stage 
 
This table reports results from the following regression:  
 
ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܨ݁ܽݐݑݎ݁௜,௝,௧ ൌ
ߙ ൅ ߚଵܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄_ܵݐܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൈ ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄_ܵݐܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅
ߛଵܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁ݎݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜,௧ ൅ 	ߛଶܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ_ܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଷܮ݋ܽ݊‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௝,௧ ൅
	ߛସܧܿ݋݊݋݉ݕ‐ݓ݅݀݁_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௧ ൅ ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܶݕ݌݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ܮ݋ܽ݊_ܲݑݎ݌݋ݏ݁_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧ ,  
         
where the dependent variable, Loan_Feature, is one of the three loan contract variables: (1) the number of performance covenants (Performance 
Covenants); (2) an indicator for the loan contracts that include performance pricing provisions (Performance_Pricing); and (3) the natural 
logarithm of loan spread (Loan_Spread), which is measured by the drawn all-in spread charged by the bank over the LIBOR for the drawn portion 
of the loan facility. The Poisson regression, Logit regression, and OLS regression methods are used for the three dependent variables, respectively. 
CEO_Protection is an indicator for CEO contractual protection; it equals 1 if the CEO has an employment agreement or a standalone severance 
pay agreement, and 0 otherwise. Growth_Stage equals 1 if the firm-year is in the growth life-cycle stage, and 0 otherwise. Following Hribar and 
Yehuda (2015), we create a life-cycle-stage score by summing the standardized values of (1) sales growth, (2) capital expenditures, (3) net-capital 
transactions, and (4) (inverse ranking of) firm age. Firm-years ranked in the top quintile based on this summary score are classified into the growth 
life-cycle stage. See Appendix A for the measurement of control variables. We add to the regressions the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the 
first-stage regression to control for the endogeneity of CEO contractual protection. See Appendix B for details of the first-stage regression. The 
sample includes 5,340 loans issued S&P 1500 firms over the period 1995-2008. The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm 
clustering. The p-values are one-sided for CEO_Protection and the interaction term, and two-sided otherwise. 
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TABLE 9 (Cont’d) 
  
(1) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance Covenants  
(2) 
Dep. Var = 
Performance_Pricing  
(3) 
Dep. Var = 
Loan_Spread 
 Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  -0.056 0.320   0.134 0.299   0.041 0.256  
CEO_Protection × Growth_Stage  0.288 0.004   0.520 0.016   0.092 0.080  
Growth_Stage  -0.045 0.634   -0.320 0.122   -0.143 0.018  
Size  -0.355 0.000   -0.398 0.000   -0.106 0.000  
Market-to-Book  -0.097 0.006   -0.181 0.009   -0.107 0.000  
Leverage  0.784 0.000   -0.070 0.860   0.770 0.000  
Return on Assets  0.396 0.414   1.730 0.092   -1.060 0.000  
Tangibility  -0.467 0.008   -0.133 0.723   -0.068 0.492  
Cash Flow Volatility  0.005 0.121   -0.004 0.618   0.002 0.346  
Z-score  -0.024 0.450   0.041 0.598   -0.083 0.000  
CEO Equity Compensation  -0.124 0.091   0.113 0.465   0.048 0.212  
CEO Equity Ownership  0.567 0.236   1.680 0.183   0.962 0.000  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   0.038 0.053   0.001 0.987   0.000 0.978  
Loan Maturity  0.055 0.207   0.179 0.074   -0.100 0.000  
Loan Amount  0.151 0.000   0.445 0.000   -0.140 0.000  
Number of Covenants          -0.092 0.000  
Performance_Pricing          0.095 0.000  
Secured_Loan          0.533 0.000  
Secured_Missing          0.088 0.000  
∆GDP  0.968 0.460   -1.879 0.478   -3.990 0.000  
Time Trend  0.039 0.000   0.030 0.068   0.024 0.000  
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.053 0.321   -0.227 0.055   -0.021 0.487  
Loan type fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Loan purpose fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
N  5,340  5,340    5,340   
Pseudo R2 (Adj. R2)  0.160  0.156    0.687   
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TABLE 10 
CEO contractual protection and bond yield spread  
 
This table reports results from the following OLS regression of bond yield spread (Bond_Yield): 
 
ܤ݋݊݀_ܻ݈݅݁݀௜,௝,௧ ൌ
ߙ ൅ ߚܥܧܱ_ܲݎ݋ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁ݎ‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜,௧ ൅ 	ߛଶܥܧܱ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ_ܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߛଷܮ݋ܽ݊‐ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௝,௧ ൅ 	ߛସܧܿ݋݊݋݉ݕ‐ݓ݅݀݁_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௧ ൅ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ_ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎݏ ൅ ߝ௜,௝,௧ ,  
 
where Bond_Yield is measured as the offering yield of a bond minus the yield of treasures with similar maturity. CEO_Protection is an indicator 
for CEO contractual protection; it equals 1 if the CEO has an employment agreement or a standalone severance pay agreement and 0 otherwise. 
See Appendix A for the measurement of the control variables. In Column (1), we report the OLS regression results of the above equation. In 
Column (2), we replace CEO_Protection with its predicted value estimated from the first-stage regression and report the OLS regression results. In 
Column (3), we add to the OLS regression model the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated from the first-stage regression. See Appendix B for details of 
the first-stage regression. The sample includes 2,201 bonds issued by S&P 1500 firms over the period 1995-2008. The sample size is smaller for 
columns (2) and (3) due to the additional data requirement of first-stage regression. The p-values are based on standard errors adjusted for firm 
clustering. The p-values are one-sided for CEO_Protection and two-sided otherwise.  
  
60 
 
TABLE 10 (Cont’d) 
  
(1) 
Using the raw value of 
CEO contractual protection  
(2) 
Using the predicted value of 
CEO protection  
(3) 
Using the Heckman 
approach 
 Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value  
CEO_Protection  0.206 0.053   0.336 0.027   0.369 0.018  
Size  0.124 0.048   0.144 0.033   0.149 0.030  
Market-to-Book  -0.333 <.0001   -0.318 <.0001   -0.315 <.0001  
Leverage  2.856 <.0001   2.622 <.0001   2.641 <.0001  
Return on Assets  -0.909 0.378   -0.897 0.395   -0.921 0.382  
Tangibility  0.940 0.031   0.972 0.024   0.973 0.024  
Cash Flow Volatility  -0.006 0.157   -0.008 0.097   -0.008 0.103  
Z-score  -0.028 0.798   -0.052 0.647   -0.049 0.670  
CEO Equity Compensation  0.155 0.441   0.075 0.722   0.067 0.753  
CEO Equity Ownership  -0.866 0.597   -0.382 0.865   -0.274 0.903  
CEO Portfolio Sensitivity   -0.084 0.058   -0.070 0.143   -0.073 0.126  
Loan Maturity  -0.465 <.0001   -0.424 <.0001   -0.425 <.0001  
Loan Amount  -0.170 0.082   -0.219 0.037   -0.215 0.039  
∆GDP  -26.108 <.0001   -24.932 <.0001   -24.953 <.0001  
Time Trend  0.009 0.593   0.008 0.612   0.007 0.670  
Inverse Mills Ratio          -0.134 0.238  
Industry fixed effects  YES    YES    YES   
N  2,201  1,961    1,961   
Adj. R2  0.285  0.293    0.294   
 
